The current approach to the enforcement of Title VIP renders its prohibition against national origin discrimination 2 virtually meaningless for the culturally unassimilated. It permits an employer to reject qualified applicants of a particular national origin as long as he hires more assimilated applicants of the same origin instead.' Yet a refusal to hire because of cultural characteristics or traits is nothing less than discrimination on the basis of national origin. As it is now enforced, Title VII cannot keep its promise of individual equality; it actually perpetuates discrimination against the least assimilated members of a national origin group.
Courts should consider the heterogeneity that exists within a single national origin group in their treatment of national origin cases under Title VII. Such an approach better achieves Title VII's goal of individual protection and eliminates the denigration of cultural identity implicit in today's enforcement of the statute. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities . . . because of such individual's . . . national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) .
3. Under the current approach to national origin discrimination, the employer who intentionally discriminates among applicants on the basis of national origin-linked characteristics is generally held to have violated Title VII. See infra note 27 (cases cited therein) and accompanying text. Still, an employer might offer the hiring of one national origin group member to rebut or preclude an inference of discriminatory motive with respect to another. See infra note 29 and accompanying text. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin, 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (1984) , define "national origin discrimination. . . as including . . . the denial of equal employment opportunity because . . . an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group." That the EEOC is unwilling to apply a trait-based approach to all national origin discrimination is suggested by its further regulatory pronouncement that the use of certain characteristics as qualifying screens is not to be considered an exception to the "bottom line" rule (discussed infra notes 36-45 and accompanying text). See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.6(b) (1984) .
I. RECOGNIZING TRAIT-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Discrimination begins with an attachment of arbitrary or extraordinary significance to human differences. 4 Current enforcement of Title VII suggests that national origin discrimination in the workplace arises from employer antipathy (both conscious and unconscious) toward the mere fact of an applicant's ancestry. Yet such a view of national origin discrimination is blind to the real nature of prejudice. Differences in dress, language, accent, and custom associated with a non-American origin are more likely to elicit prejudicial attitudes than the fact of the origin itself. 5 Although Americans might celebrate the diversity of their ancestral origins, 6 they are apt to be less accepting of the traits characteristic of those origins.
Thus, not all people of the same ancestral origin are equally vulnerable to national origin discrimination. The exclusive focus upon ancestral origin in Title VII national origin cases ignores this reality. In De Voild v. Bailar, 7 for example, the Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed a MexicanAmerican's claim of national origin discrimination where the Civil Service promotion she sought went to another Mexican-American employee. " [W] hatever motives the Civil Service Commission may have had in choosing between two people of the same ethnic origin," the court concluded, "discrimination cannot have been among them." 9 But insofar as the court focused solely on ancestral origin, it may have permitted the employer to exercise a preference for one individual over another simply because the former was more assimilated. 1 " And an employer who does so has discriminated on the basis of national origin.
In allowing employers to satisfy their statutory obligation by hiring any individual or individuals of a particular ancestral origin, courts permit discrimination to persist. Most employers are naturally inclined to hire applicants who are "like" them over those who are not; absent judicial cognizance of that fact, Title VII becomes a statute which, at best, coerces job applicants to assimilate and, at worst, keeps them jobless."
Courts should therefore employ a definition of national origin discrimination which includes the concept of discrimination on the basis of national origin-linked (i.e., cultural) traits. 2 Under such a trait-based approach, an individual's employment opportunities would not be limited, as 9. 568 F.2d at 1165. The court also stated: "Any unfairness in the choice between the plaintiff and [the promotion recipient] cannot have had its source in discrimination based on national origin; this being so, there is no Title VII action." Id.
10. The Fifth Circuit should have been especially wary of this possibility given the Civil Service Commission's prior determination that the defendant had initially passed over both MexicanAmerican clerks for promotion because of their national origin. 568 F.2d at 1163. See supra note 5 (employer prejudiced against national origin group per se likely to choose more assimilated of two individuals from that group).
11. Inasmuch as some national origin-linked characteristics are immutable, the unassimilated group member may face an absolute barrier to job opportunity rather than coercive pressure to assimilate. A Mexican immigrant who has learned English upon his arrival in America may find it nearly impossible to discard his Spanish accent. 12. Judicial acceptance of plaintiff classes not limited to individuals of a single ancestral origin may be taken at least as an indication of receptiveness to the notion of trait-based discrimination. If courts were concerned exclusively with discrimination directed at ancestral origin, they might insist that plaintiffs and plaintiff classes define themselves as "Mexican-Americans," "Cuban-Americans," etc., and that they segregate their claims along those lines. Implicit in the grouping of plaintiffs from various origins into composite categories like "Hispanic," "Spanish language," and "Spanishsurnamed," see, e.g., Lasso v. , may be an assumption that such individuals have common characteristics that cross national lines, and that make them similarly vulnerable to discriminatory employment practices. The fact that such characteristics are national origin-linked means that discrimination on that basis is national origin discrimination. This Note would not bar the grouping of plaintiffs of different ancestral origins. Indeed, it would support the grouping of such plaintiffs where they are similarly unassimilated. Courts that do approve the grouping of different ancestral origins should be particularly they are now, by non-job-related personal characteristics that manifest cultural identity. 3 The law would recognize that employers might draw distinctions, not just among individuals of different ancestral origins, but also among individuals of the same ancestral origin.
Current enforcement of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196714 reflects such an enlightened understanding of group heterogeneity. The statute defines a specially protected category of individuals, ages forty through sixty-nine. 15 Any employer who fires all of his sixty-nine year-old employees and replaces them with forty year-olds, simply because the latter are younger, does not diminish the representation of the protected category in his work force; nevertheless, he displaces the older members of the group solely because of the extent to which they possess the trait being protected-age. Accordingly, the courts have held it a violation of the Act to choose between two individuals on the basis of their age, even when both are within the protected group. 16 Each national origin group is similarly heterogeneous. There are the "forty year-olds"-fifth generation Americans who are completely assimilated-and the "sixty-nine year-olds"-immigrants of the same origin who speak and dress in a distinctly foreign manner. Between them are the many shades of grey. Under the ADEA, each shade is perceptibly distinct; we know that forty-five year-olds are older (and thus, generally more susceptible to age discrimination) than forty year-olds. Under Title VII's prohibition against discrimination on the basis of national origin, however, there are no such clear demarcations; we cannot measure assimilation in precise units. Yet imprecision in measurability cannot justify neglect of the real differences among individuals and the real discrimination careful in ensuring that the broader group (e.g., "Hispanic") does not include ancestral origin groups of different degrees of assimilation.
13. Accent and skin pigmentation are among the most obvious examples of national origin-linked characteristics. Others include those over which the applicant arguably has more control, such as surname, knowledge of American history, This is not to suggest, however, that an applicant's lack of assimilation-or more accurately, its characteristic manifestations-can never justify an employer's adverse hiring decision.
17 A Mexican-American who possesses a strong Spanish accent is probably not suited for a position as a speech therapist.' 8 The trait-based approach to national origin discrimination does not command that he be hired anyway. 9 It suggests only that if he is denied a job oportunity because of his accent, the denial should be grounded in a legitimate business concern 0 rather than in prejudice against people who possess traits characteristic of Mexican origin. Implicit in a concept of sexual equality that adopts traditional male roles is an arguably sexist presumption that male roles are the more desirable. See id. at 506. Similarly, the equality offered by the trait-based approach may be an equality viewed through an ethnocentric lens. A more radical restructuring of Title VII is beyond the scope of this Note, however. See infra notes 19 & 63 (trait-based approach would preserve present notions of business necessity).
19.
In this respect, the trait-based approach leaves undisturbed the currently accepted conception of Title VII's antidiscrimination goals. As the Court stated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971), "Congress did not intend by Title VII . . . to guarantee a job to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group." 20. Under § 703(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982), the employer may invoke the defense of a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) to justify explicit national origin discrimination. As applied to the trait-based approach, the BFOQ defense would permit the employer to hire on the basis of a national origin-linked characteristic where such a characteristic was "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of the employer's business. Id. The employer may defend against a showing of adverse effect by demonstrating the "business necessity" of the disputed employment practice-i.e., by showing the practice "to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977). The employer would be entitled to make such a demonstration under the trait-based approach as well.
II. APPLYING THE TRAIT-BASED APPROACH UNDER TITLE VII
A Title VII discrimination claim may proceed under either of two different theories of liability that together promote the equality objective of Title VII. In the "disparate treatment" case, "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical." 2 " The plaintiff must demonstrate the employer's intent to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. In the "disparate impact" case, "[piroof of discriminatory motive . . . is not required." 2 2 The plaintiff may prevail simply by establishing the adverse effect of a particular employee selection device upon the protected group to which he belongs. The disparate impact theory envisions "the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" maintained by facially neutral practices.
3
Judicial acceptance of the trait-based approach would expand considerably the scope of an employer's potential liability in both kinds of cases. This expansion is nevertheless consistent with the language and purpose of Title VII. Because the basic prohibitory provisions of the statute are cast in general terms and do not provide a precise definition of national origin discrimination, 24 (1973) . "The only direct definition given the phrase 'national origin,"' was precipitated because a clerical error caused the words to be deleted from the House version of the bill. Id. at 89. Congressman Roosevelt, Chairman of the House Subcommittee that reported the bill, explained to his colleagues that "'national origin' means national. It means the country from which you or your forebears came from." 110 CONG. REc. 2549 REc. (1964 . But what constitutes national origin discrimination? The history of the statute is silent on the subject. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF "national origin" was used infrequently prior to the adoption of Title VII; 26 thus, the statute did not incorporate a previously accepted definition of the term. Given the consistency of the trait-based approach to national origin discrimination with Title VII's ultimate aim of individual equality, the courts should adopt that approach in the adjudication of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.
A. Disparate Treatment
Under the current approach to national origin discrimination, the victim of intentional trait-based discrimination is generally entitled to relief.1 7 Plaintiff's proof of (i) his membership in a protected group, (ii) his application and qualification for the job, (iii) his rejection by the employer and (iv) the employer's continued consideration of applicants with similar qualifications, establishes a prima facie case, 28 whether the plaintiff's rejection was grounded in group membership per se or in traits associated with that membership. In some cases, however, an employer has been able 1964 (1968) . to put forward his hiring of another group member to rebut or even preclude the inference of discriminatory motive in refusing to hire the plaintiff. 2 9 Such cases stand firmly opposed to Title VII's promise of individual protection, as reflected in both its text and legislative history. Section 703(a)(1) prohibits discrimination "against any individual"; section 703(a)(2) prohibits practices which "deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities." 0 Senators Clark and Case, bipartisan floor managers of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, submitted to the Senate an interpretive memorandum stating:
[D]iscrimination is prohibited as to any individual. While the presence or absence of other members of the same minority group in the work force may be a relevant factor in determining whether in a given case a decision to hire or to refuse to hire was based on race, color, etc., it is only one factor and the question in each case would be whether that individual was discriminated against. 1 The trait-based approach better accords with this vision of Title VII. In a case like De Volld v. Bailar, 3 2 the defendant employer should not be able to insulate himself from liability for discriminating against one MexicanAmerican simply by promoting another. Disparate treatment is disparate treatment, no matter who reaps its benefits.
Courts have upheld this vision of Title VII in cases involving discrimination on the basis of race and sex. In Reeb v. Marshall," 3 the Eighth Circuit concluded that a plaintiff discharged because of her "failure to conform to her supervisor's stereotype of a professional woman" could prevail under Title VII's disparate treatment theory, even though she was replaced by another woman." And in an action brought by the EEOC, a court determined that the selection of a light-skinned, caucasian-featured black applicant over a qualified but dark-skinned, black-featured one was actionable. 3 5 The same logic that has informed disparate treatment analysis in such race and sex cases should be applied in national origin cases as well. 
See
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B. Disparate Impact
An employer whose selection criteria, taken separately and together, have no adverse impact upon a given national origin group, is presently safe from the disparate impact claims of rejected group members. 36 Yet a selection process, or even a single selection criterion, that results in group parity may still have an adverse impact on the least assimilated individuals in that group. 7 While no court has recognized the disparate impact claim of a "subgroup" defined by national origin-linked traits, 38 the Supreme Court's reasoning in Connecticut v. Teal 39 implicitly supports such a claim. Teal affirmed Title VII's role in protecting individuals from employment discrimination under even the group-oriented disparate impact theory. The Court rejected Connecticut's 40 assertion that the "bottom line" of its selection process-the proportional representation of blacks among promotion recipients-immunized it from liability for the adverse impact of a particular promotion criterion. 41 Citing the statute's 36. Indeed, the EEOC will not sustain a disparate impact claim made out with respect to certain criteria of selection where the selection process as a whole (i.e., the "bottom line") produces no adverse impact upon the relevant national origin group. For example, "the Commission does not consider . . . the denial of employment opportunities because of an individual's foreign accent . . . to be [an] exception[ ] to the 'bottom line' concept . . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1606.6(b). Under the trait-based approach, a disparate impact claim based on a single criterion of the selection process would not be trumped by the lack of an adverse impact at the "bottom line." Further, disparate impact claims based on either the "bottom line" or a single criterion would be sustained even when adverse impact upon the relevant national origin group was negligible, if the complaining party were able to demonstrate an adverse impact upon the least assimilated individuals of the relevant group.
37. See supra note 5 and text accompanying note 11. One scholar has pointed out that a selection process which results in group parity for both blacks and women may still have an adverse effect upon the subgroup of individuals defined by their membership in both protected categories. She advocates the use of disparate impact analysis for such "compound discrimination" cases. 41. 457 U.S. at 451-52. The dissenters in Teal charged that the majority's repudiation of the "bottom line" principle was "inconsistent with the very nature of disparate-impact claims." Id. at 456 (Powell, J., dissenting). Disparate impact theory, by definition, focuses on groups, and attempts to achieve equality through enhanced group opportunity. Id. at 459-60. But it is unfair to extract from this limitation in the means of achieving equality a restricted scope of the ultimate equality to be achieved. Even the dissenters agreed that the aim of Title VII is to protect individuals rather than groups. Id. at 458; see also Case Note, The Bottom Line Concept Under Title VII. Connecticut v. Teal, 24 B.C.L. REV. 1131, 1172 (1983) ("The Teal majority correctly recognized that the individual is to be the focus of the protection offered by Title VII."). But see Blumrosen, The Group Interest language 4 2 as well as its legislative history, 43 the Court concluded that "Title VII strives to achieve equality of opportunity by rooting out... [employment practices] that have a discriminatory impact upon individuals. ' 44 Thus, the overall proportionality of Connecticut's selection process could not vindicate the use of a non-job-related test which eliminated a subgroup of black individuals from the promotion competition. The same analysis applies with equal force to a single criterion of the selection process: A proportional outcome should not be allowed to mask the discriminatory impact of even one selection criterion upon a subgroup of individuals defined by their possession of group-linked characteristics. The traitbased approach is essential to rooting out employment practices that discriminate against the least assimilated individuals of a national origin group solely because of the extent to which they possess the traits characteristic of group membership. 4 Intra-group heterogeneity makes deceptive the use of the national origin group as a benchmark for statistical comparison; such a benchmark can disguise real differences in job opportunity among individuals within that broad category. Under current law, for example, if an applicant pool and 43. The Court remarked that Title VII's legislative history is "replete with references to protection for the individual employee." 457 U.S. at 454. The opinion cited the Clark-Case memorandum, quoted supra text accompanying note 31, and the following comment made by Senator Williams: "Every man must be judged according to his ability. In that respect, all men are to have an equal opportunity to be considered for a particular job." 110 CONG. REC. 8921 (1964) . One of the bill's major proponents, Senator Humphrey, told his colleagues: "[Tihe issue here is not how many people are employed. The issue is whether a man shall be denied the opportunity to be employed on the basis of his merit . 702 (1978) , reflects a similar concern for individual, as opposed to group, opportunity. The case presented a Title VII-based challenge to employer-administered pension plans that required larger contributions from women than from men because the former, as a group, live longer. The Court posed the issue as "whether the existence or nonexistence of 'discrimination' is to be determined by comparison of class characteristics or individual characteristics." Id. at 708. It concluded that the basic policy of Title VII "requires [a] focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes." Id. at 709. Accord, Arizona Governing Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (women may not be paid lower monthly pension benefits than men who have made same contributions simply because women, as a class, outlive men).
45. The trait-based approach would apply the force of Teal's analysis beyond the framework of Teal itself. In Teal, the Court sustained a challenge to a single component of the employer's selection process that had an adverse impact upon a protected group. Under the trait-based approach, the courts would sustain not only a challenge to a single component of the selection process that had an adverse impact upon a national group, but also a challenge to a single component of the selection process that had an adverse impact upon the least assimilated individuals of that group. Currently, the EEOC will not sustain either type of challenge. See supra note 36. work force were made up entirely of Mexican-Americans, the rejected applicants could not establish a prima facie disparate impact case 46 no matter how culturally skewed the employer's selection device. And yet, the individuals with strong cultural identities might still have been the victims of national origin discrimination.
Under the trait-based approach to national origin discrimination, the broad group of Mexican-Americans would not necessarily be the benchmark for statistical comparison. Ideally, the benchmark would correspond, as closely as possible, to the claimant's level of cultural assimilation-i.e., the extent to which he possesses national origin-linked characteristics. For the qualified Mexican-American who is only minimally assimilated, the benchmark for statistical comparison would be those qualified applicants and job-holders who are similarly unassimilated. Courts would compare the success rate of the applicant pool not to the success rate of the entire group of Mexican-Americans, but to the success rate of the subgroup to which the claimant belongs. 47 Similarly, courts would compare the representation of that particular subgroup in the employer's work force with its representation in the relevant population, rather than comparing the representation of the entire group of Mexican-Americans in the employer's work force with its representation in the relevant population." 8 To be sure, the delineation of such subgroups may prove complicated. Unlike the single criterion of year of birth that courts might use to identify subgroups within the ADEA's protected category of forty to sixty-nine year-olds, 49 no single criterion measures so precisely the different degrees of assimilation under the trait-based approach to national origin discrimination. The distinction between Mexican-Americans and non-MexicanAmericans rests on an objective characteristic-ancestry. The distinction between more and less assimilated Mexican-Americans is not as readily apparent.
There are indirect (if imperfect) ways, however, to measure the extent of an individual's assimilation. Courts might focus their attention on a single criterion-the primary language spoken in each applicant's home, for example 5°-and use that criterion as a proxy for the degree of an individual's assimilation." 1 Americans of Hispanic origin who speak English at home are apt to be more assimilated than those who do not. Therefore, an Hispanic plaintiff who speaks Spanish at home might properly rely upon statistical comparisons that use as benchmarks the selection success rate or work force representation of only those Hispanics who speak Spanish at home. 52 One court has used a series of proxies, including primary language and level of education, to distinguish subgroups of Hispanics in a section 1983 action.
53
Of course, no proxy is perfect. Hispanics who speak Spanish at home, for example, are not all unassimilated to the same degree, just as Hispanics who speak English at home are not all assimilated to the same degree. Courts should proceed with caution here. Subgroup categories might be manipulated until a colorable claim of wrongful discrimination arises. With each opportunity to show adverse impact, the probability that some adverse impact can be shown is enhanced, even if that result is simply a product of sampling variation. Statistically significant results may arise by chance alone. See Shoben, supra note 37, at 807 & 820. Courts should be alert to this problem. They might want to require a higher threshold of proof for a subgroup claim than for a national origin group claim. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures presently embrace a "4/5ths" rule: If the minority hiring rate is less than 4/5ths of the non-minority rate, adverse impact is deemed established. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1984) .
51. Although the reporting of such statistics may raise privacy and fraud problems, these problems do not appear to be much more intractable than those that arise under the present rule requiring the reporting of national origin statistics. Moreover, the EEOC might investigate the possibility of employing additional safeguards to ensure that such data are recorded accurately and discreetly.
52. Such group subdivisions may cut the other way as well. A defendant-employer might rebut a plaintiff's statistical showing of an adverse impact upon the broad group of all Hispanics by pointing to the lack of an adverse impact upon the more assimilated group of Hispanics represented by the plaintiff. Of course, less assimilated Hispanics would still have a valid discrimination claim against the employer. Under Rule 23(c)(4)(B), "a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class." FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Occasionally, a subgroup might prefer not to make out a special claim in order to enhance group solidarity. Consideration of how a judge should decide whether to approve such a class under Rule 23 is beyond the scope of this Note. Cf Shoben, supra note 37, at 832 ("[T]he broad purpose of Title VII to eradicate discrimination. . . suggests a policy favoring large classes.") (footnote omitted).
53. (Ist Cir. 1972 ). In defining a class of "Spanish-surnamed persons" for class certification under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court acknowledged the differences between persons such as "a native American with a Spanish surname whose ancestors had for generations lived in the United States" and "persons who were born or whose parents were born in Puerto Rico, Cuba, or other Caribbean countries, whose primary language is Spanish, and who have not had education and training comparable to that received by most mainstream white Americans." Indeed, it is likely that there will be some overlap: Some Hispanics whose primary language is Spanish may be even more assimilated than their primarily English-speaking counterparts. Theoretically, since each individual represents a different degree of assimilation and therefore possesses a different vulnerability to discrimination, adverse impact should be determined solely with respect to the individual claimant. By its very nature, though, the disparate impact case turns on statistical comparisons of groups rather than individuals: Deviations from a group norm of assimilation are statistically unavoidable. 54 The goal of the trait-based approach is simply to minimize those deviations, to the extent it is feasible, by providing for more than one norm within each national origin group. Courts should measure adverse impact upon as homogeneous a group as possible and scrutinize both claims and remedial decrees for their effect on identifiable national origin subgroups. 55 
III. TRAIT-BASED DISCRIMINATION IN SOCIAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
In fulfilling Title VII's goal of individual equality, the trait-based approach also accords with antidiscrimination principles, and promotes other important social and constitutional values.
A. Eliminating Segregation and the Stigmatic Effects of Coercive Assimilation
The current approach to national origin discrimination offers a choice between segregation and coercive assimilation. For the national origin 54. To the extent that the use of a subgroup minimizes the standard deviation from a group norm of assimilation, it provides a more effective mechanism of antidiscrimination enforcement. Of course, the deviations cannot be so great or widespread as to make meaningless a statistical showing of adverse impact. Using primary spoken language as a proxy makes such an occurrence unlikely, however, since that characteristic is itself an essential element of assimilation (or cultural independence, as the case may be).
55. The trait-based approach would also ensure a more equitable allocation of compensatory resources in court-approved consent decrees and court-ordered affirmative action programs. An employer found to have unlawfully discriminated on the basis of ancestral origin-i.e., against the broad group of Mexican-Americans-would not be able to redress that inequity through an affirmative action program that provided jobs only to the most assimilated Americans of Mexican descent. Nor would a judge be able to give his approval to a consent decree that was unresponsive to the claims of the least assimilated members of a national group. He might take particular care that the spectrum of assimilation was adequately represented in the membership of the national origin group's negotiating party.
Voluntary affirmative action plans might also be subject to trait-based scrutiny. A plan that set aside a certain number or percentage of positions for individuals of a particular national group might be considered unlawful if it discriminated against the least assimilated group members (such as those whose primary language was not English).
group member whose distinctive ethnic and cultural traits are, for practical purposes, immutable, 5 a promise of equality predicated upon their disappearance is a sham. It is like the promise made to a black child that he can attend a particular school if he sheds his black skin color. Each promise discriminates on the basis of irrelevant, immutable characteristics, contrary to the teaching of Brown v. Board of Education. 57 Even where national origin-linked traits are not immutable, exclusion on that basis is antithetical to our notion of equality. 58 Brown's reliance upon the stigmatic harms of legally enforced separation 5 9 suggests that exclusion on the basis of any national origin-linked characteristic should be impermissible. Forced assimilation, like segregation, may "generate a feeling of inferiority" ' that stigmatizes a minority group. To tell the minority group member that he must discard the characteristic manifestations of his national identity in order to have a truly equal and fair opportunity to compete for a job is to tell him that his identity has no place in American The court did note that "[clourts also have found discrimination in situations in which, although the basis of discrimination was not strictly immutable, a fundamental right was thought to be involved." 618 F.2d at 269 n.5 (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employer may not refuse to hire women with pre-school age children absent business necessity); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (rule prohibiting female stewardesses but not male stewards from getting married held discriminatory), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971) ). An assertion of cultural identity may involve just such a right-free expression and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. See infra text accompanying note 67.
Garcia might also be distinguished on the basis of the district court's finding that the employer had several legitimate business reasons for enforcing the challenged rule, such as that it would better allow supervisors "to oversee the work of subordinates." 618 F.2d at 267. society. 6 " Indeed, it is to exclude him from that society as long as he retains his ethnic identity. In sum, the reasoning which led the Court to strike down segregation in Brown also suggests the importance of the trait-based approach in protecting cultural identity as an element of equality.
B. Promoting Cultural Pluralism
The cultural pluralism 2 that a trait-based approach to national origin discrimination would encourage is itself a value of social and constitutional significance. By allowing members of various nationalities to maintain, without penalty, their cultural heritage and identity," 3 the law nurtures a society richer in breadth and diversity-a society built upon the contributions and assets of the many rather than the few."6 Cultural pluralism has, in the last twenty years, surfaced as an important value for 61. As Justice Douglas once wrote of a school regulation which effectively prohibited Native Americans from wearing long, braided hair:
The results of such a policy . . . to force all students into one homogeneous mold even when it impinges on their racial and cultural values, have been disastrous for the young Indian child who is taught in school that the culture in which he has been reared is not important or valid.
New Rider v. Board of Educ., cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097, 1102-03 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (emphasis added).
62. As used in this Note, "cultural pluralism" denotes that value which supports the right of a national group member to exercise the option of maintaining the culture and heritage that comprise his identity. The theory of cultural pluralism has its roots in the work of Horace M. Kallen. See H. 63. Of course, there is a limit to the amount of atomization which any society can withstand and still remain cohesive. This Note does not suggest that jobs must be defined without reference to business needs. "The touchstone," to borrow a phrase from the Supreme Court, "is business necessity" as presently conceived. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
64. See Kopan, Melting Pot: Myth or Reality?, in CULTURAL PLURALISM, supra note 62, at 37, 54:
Cultural pluralism has given America its strength. Immigration has made the United States a world power of over 200 million people. The immigrants that came to America, both white and black, tilled the fields, manned the industries, built the railroads, and did many other things that made the country the industrial giant that it is. As its motto-E pluribus unum-proclaims, the United States remains truly one nation out of many people. many Americans," and ethnicity has become a focal point for political strength rather than an object of shame. 6 That every individual is entitled to retain the distinctive ethnic traits that comprise his identity is a notion rooted in the Constitution's protections of individual liberty. First Amendment doctrine, in particular, supports the value of cultural pluralism. By explicitly protecting religion and speech from undue state intrusion, the First Amendment protects the primary components of culture. To the extent that culture takes either of those forms, cultural pluralism is afforded a constitutional safeguard. 67 Of course, this pluralistic vision clashes with the pervasive image of the American melting pot. 6 " That paradigm envisions the assimilation of all newcomers into a singular American identity, from which cultural and ethnic differences have disappeared.
A tension between these two ideals-cultural pluralism on the one hand and assimilation on the other-is an inevitable outgrowth of the integrative efforts of a minority ethnic group that seeks also to preserve its distinct cultural identity. Almost by definition, integration involves assimilation. Yet achieving integration does not require a wholesale abandonment group members, and ultimately, with those available to Americans who trace their ancestry to the Mayflower.
-Stephen M. Cutler

